As of today I count 137620 domains with correct DANE TLSA records
for SMTP. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted the
handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in
bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by
domain count are:
60764 domeneshop.no
43961 transip.nl
15734 udmedia.de
3040 bhosted.nl
1493 nederhost.net
904 ec-elements.com
431 core-networks.de
307 uvt.nl
301 bit.nl
287 omc-mail.com
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, in particular .de, .nl and .no.
There are 2449 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed. Alternatively, a similar number is seen in the count
(2613) of distinct MX host server certificates that support the
same ~137000 domains.
A related number is 4172 TLSA RRsets found for MX host TCP port 25.
This includes secondary MX hosts and domains none of whose primary
MX hosts have TLSA records.
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is now 105 (this is my ad-hoc criterion
for a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 56 are in recent reports (March 2017):
gmx.at jpberlin.de overheid.nl
nic.br lrz.de pathe.nl
registro.br mail.de wooniezie.nl
gmx.ch posteo.de xs4all.nl
open.ch ruhr-uni-bochum.de domeneshop.no
anubisnetworks.com tum.de webcruitermail.no
gmx.com uni-erlangen.de debian.orgmail.com unitymedia.de domainmail.orgpiratenexus.com web.de freebsd.orgpirateperfection.com enron.email gentoo.orgpre-sustainability.com octopuce.fr ietf.orgt-2.comcomcast.netnetbsd.orgtrashmail.comdd24.netnetcoolusers.orgxfinity.comgmx.netopenssl.org
bayern.de hr-manager.netsamba.org
bund.de t-2.nettorproject.org
elster.de xs4all.net minmyndighetspost.se
fau.de asp4all.nl skatteverket.se
gmx.de ouderportaal.nl
A different metric is how many of the DANE-enabled domains received
email from at least 10 Gmail senders in a recent 8 day interval.
Back in Dec/2016 I reported that ~2200 out of ~105k domains met
that criterion. This month, the number was ~3900 out of ~137k
domains. So it seems that a non-negligible fraction of the increase
is from real domains that receive email, and not just parked domains.
Of the ~137000 domains, 655 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover
only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some
of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual
active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 96 (~30 are recent additions that may be resolved soon,
the remaining ~60 are the for now stable population of broken
domains). This month I'm posting the list of the 44 underlying MX
hosts that serve these domains and whose TLSA records don't match
reality.
Hall of Shame:
mail.dipietro.id.au www.mtg.de mail.inu.nl
clubeararaquarense.org.br mx1.spamsponge.de mail.jekuiken.nl
mail.antiphishing.ch mail.nonoserver.info mail.myzt.nl
mail.digitalwebpros.com mx.datenknoten.me bounder.steelyard.nl
mail.dnsmadefree.com mx.giesen.me mx.wm.net.nz
demo.liveconfig.commail.castleturing.netbaobrien.orgny-do.pieterpottie.comdatawebb.dafcorp.netsmtp.copi.orgdiablo.sgt.comanubis.delphij.neteumembers.datacentrix.orgtusk.sgt.comdorothy.goldenhairdafo.net smtp2.amadigi.ovh
mx.bels.cz hs.kuzenkov.net webmail.headsite.se
johniez.cz oostergo.net protector.rajmax.si
mail.pksvice.cz ren.warunek.net arch-server.hlfh.space
srv01.101host.de mail.e-rave.nl mail.blackcherry-management.co.uk
mail.cdbm.de mail.hhsk.nl email.themcintyres.us
mail.manima.de box.inpoint-mailt.nl
The number of domains with bad DNSSEC support is 322. The top 10
DNS providers (by broken domain count) are:
52 axc.nl - Slated to be resolved
38 infracom.nl - Slated to be resolved
18 loopia.se
18 active24.cz
14 jsr-it.nl
12 rdw.nl
9 cas-com.net
8 metaregistrar.nl
6 tiscomhosting.nl
6 thednscompany.com
Around 60 of the broken domains have at least one working nameserver,
and so are email-reachable, given enough retries.
--
Viktor.
Summary: Mostly the same as last month, with significant progress
on the DNS front, as infracom.nl's nameservers now handle
TLSA lookups correctly (they now respond with valid denial
of existence or actual TLSA records as appropriate).
The number of DANE-enabled domains that have also been
sighted on Google's email transparency report has increased
from 111 to 114, while the number of DNS zones with
TLSA-enabled MX hosts has increased from 2615 to 2668.
The overall count has increased from 171460 to 171738.
NOTE 1:
This month I've begun the transition to new backend code for
the survey. The main visible change is that MX hosts that are,
despite RFC requirements, CNAMEs for the real underlying host
are no longer excluded from the survey. This leads to a small
bump in the reported domain count (+81) that is due to the code
change.
NOTE 2:
The survey only includes domains at least of whose "primary"
MX hosts has secure TLSA records. The previous survey code
skipped past any MX hosts that provably (DNSSEC-validated) had
neither IPv4 nor IPv6 addresses (secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA).
The new survey code makes this more difficult, and I may at
some point stop including these domains (613 at last count).
As of today I count 171738 domains with correct DANE TLSA records
for SMTP. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted the
handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in
bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by
domain count are:
69168 domeneshop.no
60171 transip.nl
18330 udmedia.de
6611 bhosted.nl
1809 nederhost.net
1341 yourdomainprovider.net -- (includes former networking4all.net domains)
1002 ec-elements.com
512 core-networks.de
378 omc-mail.com
342 bit.nl
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de.
There are 2668 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed. Alternatively, a similar number is seen in the count
(2910) of distinct MX host server certificates that support the
same ~171000 domains (this month the count includes all the MX
hosts, rather just a single primary MX).
A related number is 3797 matching TLSA RRsets found for MX host
TCP port 25. These certificates are vended by 3951 distinct MX
hosts (some of which clearly employ a shared certificate).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 114 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 56 are in recent reports:
gmx.at lrz.de otvi.nl
nic.br mail.de ouderportaal.nl
registro.br posteo.de overheid.nl
gmx.ch ruhr-uni-bochum.de pathe.nl
open.ch tum.de uvt.nl
anubisnetworks.com uni-erlangen.de xs4all.nl
gmx.com unitymedia.de domeneshop.no
mail.com web.de webcruitermail.no
solvinity.comtilburguniversity.edudebian.orgtrashmail.com enron.email freebsd.orgxfinity.com octopuce.fr gentoo.orgxfinityhomesecurity.comcomcast.netietf.org
bayern.de dd24.netisc.org
bund.de gmx.netnetbsd.org
elster.de hr-manager.netopenssl.org
fau.de mpssec.netsamba.org
freenet.de t-2.nettorproject.org
gmx.de xs4all.net asf.com.pt
jpberlin.de asp4all.nl
Of the ~172000 domains, 888 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover
only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some
of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual
active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 101. Below is a list of the 55 underlying MX hosts that
serve these domains and whose TLSA records don't match reality:
Hall of Shame:
mail.dipietro.id.au h-hibernia.olnis-net.de dorothy.goldenhairdafo.net
eumembers.stansoft.bg mx1.spamsponge.de mail.iaelu.netmx.delphij.com mail.stmartin-schwabach.de hs.kuzenkov.netmail.digitalwebpros.com mx.thorko.de oostergo.netdemo.liveconfig.com smtp.flipmail.es cinnamon.nl
intranet.nctechcenter.com mail.0pc.eu mail.e-rave.nl
ny-do.pieterpottie.com palinet.eu mail.jekuiken.nl
diablo.sgt.com mx.quentindavid.fr mail.myzt.nl
tusk.sgt.com servmail.fr bounder.steelyard.nl
mx1.wittsend.com mail.nonoserver.info mail.abanto-zierbena.org
mx.bels.cz mail.bax.is beerstra.org
gaia.nfx.cz mail.laukas.lt eumembers.datacentrix.org
mail.b0red.de mx.datenknoten.me smtp3.amadigi.ovh
mail.bg-netzwerk.de mx.giesen.me mail.pasion.ro
mail.denniseffing.de completelyunoriginal.moe puggan.se
mutt.lsexperts.de mail.castleturing.net mail.rostit.se
mail.manima.de horse.cherrypet.net protector.rajmax.si
www.mtg.deanubis.delphij.net
h-hibernia.olnis-Net.de goldenhairdafo.net
The number of domains with bad DNSSEC support is 374. The top 10
DNS providers with problem domains are:
66 jsr-it.nl
26 active24.cz
25 tiscomhosting.nl
19 firstfind.nl
16 rdw.nl
9 metaregistrar.nl
9 ignum.com
8 ovh.net
8 loopia.se
7 rootdomains.nl
Around 46 of the broken domains have at least one working nameserver,
and so are email-reachable, given enough retries. Only 5 of the
DNS-broken domains appear in historical Google Email transparency
reports:
tiviths.com.br
tre-sp.jus.br
trt1.jus.br
trtrj.jus.br
tse.jus.br
The associated DNS lookup issues are:
_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
[ See <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue-08>,
Much of the TLSA non-response issue seems to be related to a
"feature" of Arbor Networks firewalls, that enables droping of
DNS requests for all but the most common RRtypes. Do not make
the mistake of enabling this firewall "feature". ]
The oldest outstanding DNS issue is another SOA signature issue
at truman.edu dating back to Nov/2014:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.barracuda.truman.edu/VGzORw/dnssec/
I hope some day soon they'll start missing email they care about
and take the time to resolve the problem.
--
Viktor.
Hello,
Some time ago, Comcast rolled out TLSA records for senders to utilize when sending to "comcast.net" recipients, allowing senders to authenticate the certificates presented by our MTAs. In continuing support for DANE, we intend to deploy pilot code for outbound DANE this week, allowing us to do the same for traffic coming from our platform destined for other sites. We will pilot this with a few chosen domains that we've contacted and have made aware of our plans. Once we feel more comfortable with this, we will remove the restrictions and attempt DANE for all destination domains (with an exemption list for known-broken destination domains). If you would like to submit your domain to be part of the pilot, please drop me a note off-list.
--
Alex Brotman
Sr. Engineer, Anti-Abuse
Comcast
