Summary: The number of DANE-enabled domains that have also been sighted on Google's email transparency report has increased from 122 to 125.
The total domain count has increased from 172120 to 173857.
The number DNSSEC domains in the survey stands at 5015834, thus DANE TLSA is deployed on 3.4% of domains with DNSSEC. Many DNSSEC domains use third-party MX hosts, that don't have DNSSEC, so they can't benefit from DANE until their providers secure the MX hosts. Please ask your provider to enable DNSSEC and DANE on their MX hosts.
As of today I count 173857 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by domain count are:
68513 domeneshop.no 61900 transip.nl 18440 udmedia.de 6396 bhosted.nl 1785 nederhost.net 1284 yourdomainprovider.net 1012 ec-elements.com 507 core-networks.de 391 omc-mail.com 349 mailbox.org
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de.
There are 2969 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone, so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers deployed. There are 3672 distinct MX host certificates matched by the server's TLSA RRset.
The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 4409. These cover 4659 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA records through CNAMEs).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's email transparency report is 125 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of these, 76 are in recent reports:
gmx.at mail.de ouderportaal.nl travelbirdbelgie.be posteo.de overheid.nl nic.br ruhr-uni-bochum.de pathe.nl registro.br tum.de uvt.nl gmx.ch uni-erlangen.de xs4all.nl open.ch unitybox.de domeneshop.no anubisnetworks.com unitymedia.de webcruitermail.no gmx.com web.de debian.org isavedialogue.com egmontpublishing.dk freebsd.org mail.com tilburguniversity.edu gentoo.org solvinity.com enron.email ietf.org t-2.com octopuce.fr isc.org trashmail.com comcast.net lazarus-ide.org xfinity.com dd24.net netbsd.org xfinityhomesecurity.com gmx.net openssl.org xfinitymobile.com hr-manager.net samba.org nic.cz t-2.net torproject.org bayern.de xs4all.net asf.com.pt bund.de asp4all.nl handelsbanken.se fau.de bhosted.nl minmyndighetspost.se freenet.de bit.nl skatteverket.se gmx.de boozyshop.nl t-2.si jpberlin.de hierinloggen.nl mail.co.uk lrz.de otvi.nl govtrack.us
Of the ~174000 domains, 780 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands today at 198. Below is a list of the 101 underlying MX hosts that serve these domains and whose TLSA records don't match reality:
Hall of Shame:
white.agoracon.at mx2.spam-sponge.de mail.misbegotten.net mail.dipietro.id.au mx3.spam-sponge.de oostergo.net asp-mxtest.belnet.be mx1.spamsponge.de mx2.oostergo.net eufront.stansoft.bg mx2.spamsponge.de wfbrace.net eumembers.stansoft.bg mx3.spamsponge.de mx2.wfbrace.net andbraiz.com mx10.timotoups.de mx2.cbrace.nl mail.digitalwebpros.com fsck.email mx3.cbrace.nl mail.dnsmadefree.com smtp.flipmail.es mail.fscker.nl smtp-1.httrack.com mail.0pc.eu smtp1.lococensus.nl mail.itsmine.com mail.antoineducret.eu smtp2.lococensus.nl demo.liveconfig.com mail2.cesidianroot.eu avs.mymailcleaner.nl mx04.mykolab.com gamepixel.eu mail.myzt.nl mail.noneuclideanconcepts.com webmail.kassoft.eu nuj-netherlands.nl lon-do.pieterpottie.com smtp.skolovi.eu mx2.nuj-netherlands.nl ny-do.pieterpottie.com mail2.subse.eu bounder.steelyard.nl ma.qbitnet.com smtp.vdlaken.eu mail.abanto-zierbena.org stmics01.smia-automotive.com mx.quentindavid.fr eumembers.datacentrix.org romulus.wittsend.com servmail.fr genius.konundrum.org mail.zx.com mail.demongeot.info mx2.maicolepape.org mx.bels.cz mail.nonoserver.info smtp2.amadigi.ovh mail.davidbodnar.cz mx1.email.youwerehere.info smtp3.amadigi.ovh gaia.nfx.cz mx2.email.youwerehere.info itaskmanager.ovh petg.cz node1.mxbackup.io mail.bacrau.ro mail.seslost.cz mail.rapidfuse.io mail.itconnect.ro mail.zionbit.cz mail.lsd.is mx.itconnect.ro mail.absynth.de mail.laukas.lt mail.pasion.ro mail.all4.de mx.datenknoten.me mail.familie-sander.rocks badf00d.de mx.giesen.me mx1.shevaldin.ru mail.denniseffing.de rootbox.me halon.gislaved.se mail.friehm.de mail.adeline.mobi halon02.gislaved.se mutt.lsexperts.de mail.castleturing.net mail.labbrack.se www.mtg.de mail.culm.net mail.rostit.se mail.ocmenzel.de anubis.delphij.net mail.xn----ymcadjpj1at5o.xn--wgbh1c mx1.spam-sponge.de mail.efflam.net
Some recently notified, but the number of long-term problem MX hosts has been slowly creeping up... Please make sure to monitor the validity of your TLSA records, and implement a reliable key rotation procedure. Let's Encrypt users in particular tend to forget that by default Let's Encrypt certificate renewal replaces both the key and certificate, please read:
http://postfix.1071664.n5.nabble.com/WoSign-StartCom-CA-in-the-news-td86436.... https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/new-certbot-client-and-csr-option/15766 https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/03/lets-encrypt-certific... https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/please-avoid-3-0-1-and-3-0-2-dane-tlsa-r... http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4
When updating the certificate chain you need to temporarily pre-publish multiple TLSA records matching the current and future certificate:
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes#3
However, with "3 1 1" + "2 1 1", the rollover process can be substantially simplified:
http://postfix.1071664.n5.nabble.com/WoSign-StartCom-CA-in-the-news-td86436.... https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/uta/current/msg01498.html
After eliminating parked domains that do not accept email of any kind, the number of "real" email domains with bad DNSSEC support stands at 132. The top 6 (the rest have too few domains to include in a top 10) name server operators with problem domains are:
22 firstfind.nl 7 active24.cz 5 tse.jus.br 4 ignum.com 4 glbns.com 4 army.mil
Only 7 of the DNS-broken domains appear in historical Google Email transparency reports:
idaho.gov nsysu.edu.tw tse.jus.br rotterdam.nl tiviths.com.br trtrj.jus.br tre-ce.jus.br
The problem DNS queries are:
_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br _25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br _25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br _25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br _25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br _25._tcp.inbound.idaho.gov _25._tcp.mail.rotterdam.nl _25._tcp.barracuda.nsysu.edu.tw
[ See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue-08, Much of the TLSA non-response issue seems to be related to a "feature" of some firewalls, that enables droping of DNS requests for all but the most common RRtypes. Do not make the mistake of enabling this firewall "feature". ]
The oldest outstanding DNS issue is an SOA signature issue at truman.edu dating back to Nov/2014:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.barracuda.truman.edu/VGzORw/dnssec/
I hope some day soon they'll start missing email they care about and take the time to resolve the problem.