Hi

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote:

         Also adoption of ECDSA P-256 (algorithm 13) continues to grow,
         and the number of domains using P-256 KSKs has almost reached
         parity with RSA-SHA256 (algorithm 8), which is just ahead for
         now, but likely not for very much longer.

When a KSK is due to roll, create both a Algo-13 KSK and ZSK.  iUpload the appropriate DS. Once the new DS record is "seen" (and give it another day) - then delete the old DS, KSK and ZSK.

The KSK and ZSK signatures are much shorter - so you are less lightly to be used as a DDOS source for a DNS Denial of service attack (the amplification is way lower).

You don't need to increase the Key Size.

My KSK and ZSK are both of algorithm 8 and 2048 bits in size.

Is it correct to assume that -due to the growing adoption of algorithm 13- that this algorithm should be preferred? 
If so, I would like to migrate. 
But, I do have some questions to the community beforehand:

#) Can one mix KSK and ZSK algorithms? 

   (I do have a rollover of my ZSKs due in a couple of days. Thus starting with ZSKs would be convenient.)

#) Would it be wise to increase from 2048 to 4096 bits size?

Thanks in advance and with kind regards,
Michael