Summary: The total domain count is largely unchanged at 176970

The number DNSSEC domains in the survey stands at 5188779, thus DANE TLSA is deployed on 3.41% of domains with DNSSEC. Many DNSSEC domains use third-party MX hosts, that don't have DNSSEC, so they can't benefit from DANE until their providers secure the MX hosts. Please ask your provider to enable DNSSEC and DANE on their MX hosts. [ It would be especially significant if "redirect.ovh.net" were to implement DNSSEC+DANE. If someone personally knows the right people to gently nudge at ovh.net, please do. ]

As of today I count 176970 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by domain count are:

68354 domeneshop.no 63810 transip.nl 18587 udmedia.de 6202 bhosted.nl 1749 nederhost.nl 1231 yourdomainprovider.net 742 ec-elements.com 543 surfmailfilter.nl 517 core-networks.de 411 omc-mail.com

The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de. Speaking of countries, the IPv4 GeoIP distribution of DANE-enabled MX hosts shows the below top 10 countries (each unique IP address is counted, so multi-homed MX hosts are perhaps somewhat over-represented):

1286 DE, Germany 843 US, United States 464 NL, Netherlands 337 FR, France 190 GB, United Kingdom 112 CZ, Czech Republic 85 CA, Canada 60 CH, Switzerland 59 SE, Sweden 56 BR, Brazil

IPv6 is still comparatively rare for MX hosts, and the top 10 countries by DANE MX host IPv6 GeoIP are (same top 6).

698 DE, Germany 382 US, United States 249 NL, Netherlands 190 FR, France 99 GB, United Kingdom 61 CZ, Czech Republic 35 SE, Sweden 27 SG, Singapore 25 CH, Switzerland 13 SI, Slovenia

There are 3220 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone, so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers deployed.

The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 5219. These cover 5127 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA records through CNAMEs).

The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's email transparency report is 126 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of these, 72 are in recent reports:

gmx.at posteo.de overheid.nl travelbirdbelgique.be ruhr-uni-bochum.de pathe.nl nic.br tum.de uvt.nl registro.br uni-erlangen.de xs4all.nl gmx.ch unitybox.de domeneshop.no open.ch unitymedia.de handelsbanken.no anubisnetworks.com web.de webcruitermail.no gmx.com dk-hostmaster.dk aegee.org isavedialogue.com egmontpublishing.dk debian.org mail.com netic.dk freebsd.org solvinity.com tilburguniversity.edu gentoo.org trashmail.com insee.fr ietf.org xfinity.com octopuce.fr isc.org xfinityhomesecurity.com comcast.net netbsd.org xfinitymobile.com dd24.net openssl.org bayern.de dns-oarc.net samba.org bund.de gmx.net torproject.org elster.de hr-manager.net asf.com.pt fau.de mpssec.net handelsbanken.se freenet.de t-2.net minmyndighetspost.se gmx.de xs4all.net skatteverket.se jpberlin.de bhosted.nl t-2.si lrz.de boozyshop.nl mail.co.uk mail.de ouderportaal.nl govtrack.us

Of the ~177000 domains, 1000 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.

The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands today at 144. Below is the list of underlying MX hosts that serve these domains and whose TLSA records don't match reality:

Hall of Shame:

white.agoracon.at mail.seslost.cz mx.datenknoten.me mail.dipietro.id.au mail.zionbit.cz rootbox.me eclipse.id.au mail.3c7.de mail.castleturing.net mx.krb.srv.pique.net.au mail.absynth.de mail.culm.net zebulon.pique.net.au mail.all4.de anubis.delphij.net eufront.stansoft.bg mail.awesome-it.de mail.diejanssens.net eumembers.stansoft.bg vm-1.eveng.de mail.efflam.net andbraiz.com mail.jo8.de smtp.bl.lybre.net mail.digitalwebpros.com mx2.mindrun.de mail.fscker.nl smtp-1.httrack.com www.mtg.de smtp1.lococensus.nl mail.i-bible.com mx2.pfp.de smtp2.lococensus.nl smtp.klam.com mail.scrz44.de mail.myzt.nl demo.liveconfig.com mail.secufon.de bounder.steelyard.nl intranet.nctechcenter.com mail.secure-chat.de webmail.vivisol.nl ma.qbitnet.com mx10.timotoups.de mail.abanto-zierbena.org diablo.sgt.com mail.diplomatic.email eumembers.datacentrix.org tusk.sgt.com anotherone.braceyourself.es genius.konundrum.org stmics01.smia-automotive.com mail.0pc.eu smtp-01.tabalen.org stmics02.smia-automotive.com gamepixel.eu mail.bacrau.ro romulus.wittsend.com mail2.subse.eu mail.itconnect.ro mail.zx.com servmail.fr mx.itconnect.ro mail.allq.cz mail.victorycity.com.hk mail.pasion.ro mx2.aquasoft.cz mail.demongeot.info mail.familie-sander.rocks mx.bels.cz mail.nonoserver.info mx1.shevaldin.ru mail.davidbodnar.cz mx1.email.youwerehere.info mail.labbrack.se owl.net-art.cz mx2.email.youwerehere.info mail1.puggan.se gaia.nfx.cz masrv.dedyn.io mail.rostit.se petg.cz mail.rapidfuse.io mail.amail.si

Please make sure to monitor the validity of your TLSA records, and implement a reliable key rotation procedure. Let's Encrypt users in particular tend to forget that by default Let's Encrypt certificate renewal replaces both the key and certificate, please read:

https://mail.sys4.de/pipermail/dane-users/2018-February/000440.html http://postfix.1071664.n5.nabble.com/WoSign-StartCom-CA-in-the-news-td86436.... https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/uta/current/msg01498.html https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/new-certbot-client-and-csr-option/15766 https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/03/lets-encrypt-certific... https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/please-avoid-3-0-1-and-3-0-2-dane-tlsa-r... http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4

After eliminating parked domains that do not accept email of any kind, the number of "real" email domains with bad DNSSEC support stands at 112. The top 8 (the rest have too few domains to include in a top 10) name server operators with problem domains are:

21 firstfind.nl 7 active24.cz 6 tse.jus.br 5 metaregistrar.nl 4 ignum.com 4 glbns.com 4 army.mil 4 1cocomo.com

All DNS-broken domains that appear in historical Google Email transparency reports have at least one working nameserver.