Summary: The DANE domain count is now 1,067,099
Much of this month's adoption bump can be credited to one.com, thank you one.com. Another significant addition, is onebit.cz in 7th place, with ~13k domains.
The number of domains with DNSSEC MX records is 9,458,550. Thus DANE TLSA is deployed on 11.2% of domains with DNSSEC.
Credits: The coverage of DNSSEC domains continues to improve with ongoing data support from Paul Vixie of Farsight Security. Credits also due to ICANN for gTLD data via CZDS, and to the TLD registries for .CH, .COM, .DK, .FR, .INFO, .IS, .LI, .NL, .NU, .ORG and .SE. More data sources of ccTLD signed delegations welcome.
As of today I count 1,067,099 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the DNS/email hosting providers who've enabled DANE support for the customer domains they host. The top 20 MX host providers by domain count are:
673032 one.com 120167 transip.nl 96963 domeneshop.no 35412 active24.com 32677 vevida.com 23990 udmedia.de 12791 onebit.cz 10880 bhosted.nl 5621 previder.nl 3604 interconnect.nl 2519 provalue.nl 2381 nederhost.nl 1611 nmugroup.com 1459 yourdomainprovider.net 1325 prolocation.net 1307 hi7.de 1250 surfmailfilter.nl 1131 xcellerate.nl 1048 soverin.net 798 omc-mail.com
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.cz/.de/.eu/.be. Speaking of countries, the IPv4 GeoIP distribution of DANE-enabled MX hosts shows the below top 20 countries (each unique IP address is counted, so multi-homed MX hosts are perhaps somewhat over-represented):
4706 TOTAL 1597 DE, Germany 1003 US, United States 637 NL, Netherlands 351 FR, France 191 GB, United Kingdom 151 CZ, Czechia 88 CA, Canada 72 SG, Singapore 67 CH, Switzerland 64 SE, Sweden 42 DK, Denmark 40 IE, Ireland 40 BR, Brazil 36 AT, Austria 32 FI, Finland 32 AU, Australia 28 PL, Poland 26 RU, Russia 20 JP, Japan 17 NO, Norway
IPv6 is still comparatively rare for MX hosts, and the top 20 countries by DANE MX host IPv6 GeoIP are (same top 6).
2389 TOTAL 935 DE, Germany 384 US, United States 335 NL, Netherlands 208 FR, France 110 CZ, Czechia 88 GB, United Kingdom 37 RU, Russia 34 SE, Sweden 33 SG, Singapore 28 CH, Switzerland 21 AT, Austria 19 CA, Canada 15 IE, Ireland 13 JP, Japan 12 SI, Slovenia 12 FI, Finland 11 NO, Norway 11 DK, Denmark 11 BR, Brazil 10 AU, Australia
There are 3958 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone, so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers deployed.
The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 5760. These cover 6193 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA records through CNAMEs).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's email transparency report is 218 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of these, 109 are in recent (last 90 days of) reports:
univie.ac.at mail.de overheid.nl gmx.at posteo.de pathe.nl nic.br ruhr-uni-bochum.de photofacts.nl registro.br tum.de photofactsacademy.nl gmx.ch uni-erlangen.de politie.nl open.ch unitybox.de rijksoverheid.nl anubisnetworks.com unitymedia.de saxion.nl fmc-na.com web.de ssonet.nl gmx.com dk-hostmaster.dk transip.nl habr.com egmontpublishing.dk truetickets.nl hotelsinduitsland.com netic.dk utwente.nl kpn.com tilburguniversity.edu uvt.nl mail.com insee.fr xs4all.nl one.com octopuce.fr domeneshop.no solvinity.com web200.hu handelsbanken.no t-2.com comcast.net webcruitermail.no telfort.com dd24.net atelkamera.nu trashmail.com dns-oarc.net aegee.org xfinity.com gmx.net debian.org xfinityhomesecurity.com habramail.net freebsd.org xfinitymobile.com hr-manager.net gentoo.org active24.cz inexio.net ietf.org cuni.cz mpssec.net isc.org itesco.cz r4p3.net mailbox.org klubpevnehozdravi.cz riseup.net netbsd.org nic.cz t-2.net openssl.org smtp.cz transip.net samba.org virusfree.cz xs4all.net torproject.org allsecur.de ardanta.nl asf.com.pt bayern.de bhosted.nl handelsbanken.se bund.de boekwinkeltjes.nl minmyndighetspost.se elster.de boozyshop.nl personligalmanacka.se fau.de hierinloggen.nl skatteverket.se freenet.de intermax.nl t-2.si gmx.de mailplus.nl govtrack.us jpberlin.de minbzk.nl lrz.de ouderportaal.nl
Of the ~1.07 million domains, 2328 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands today at 402. Some of these have additional MX hosts that don't have broken TLSA records, so mail can still arrive via the remaining MX hosts. A partial list is available at:
https://github.com/danefail/list
To avoid getting listed, please make sure to monitor the validity of your own TLSA records, and implement a reliable key rotation procedure. See:
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes http://imrryr.org/~viktor/ICANN61-viktor.pdf http://imrryr.org/~viktor/icann61-viktor.mp3
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4
After eliminating parked domains that do not accept email, the number of "real" email domains with bad DNSSEC support stands at 519. The top 10 name server operators with problem domains are:
36 tiscomhosting.nl 35 dotserv.com 31 nrdns.nl 30 sylconia.net 27 metaregistrar.nl 23 active24.cz (customer zones with broken wildcard cnames) 21 nazwa.pl (customer zones with broken wildcard NS RRs) 18 movenext.nl 13 host-redirect.com 13 binero.se (remediation in progress)
If anyone has good contacts at some of these providers, please encourage them to remediate not only the broken domains (I can send them a list), but also the root cause that makes the breakage possible.
Four of the domains all whose nameservers have broken denial of existence appear in historical Google reports:
accenturealumni.com trtrio.gov.br trtrj.jus.br trt01.gov.br
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Viktor Dukhovni